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- # F5 BIG-IP WAF — Login / Refresh `accessToken` follow-up
-
- Date: 2026-10-28
- Related symptom: after login (or later on the dashboard), `localStorage.accessToken` becomes the string `"undefined"`, white blank screen, user cannot logout until local storage is cleared. Worse with **WAF blocking mode**; usually fine when blocking is off.
-
- ## Goal
-
- `/api/login` and `/api/refresh-token` (and iAM Smart login APIs) must return **untouched JSON** from the backend in blocking mode, with a real JWT in `accessToken` / `refreshToken`.
-
- The WAF must **not**:
-
- - Replace the body with an HTML block / challenge page
- - Strip or alter the `accessToken` field
- - Rewrite long base64url JWT strings in JSON
-
- ## App-side mitigation (already done)
-
- Frontend changes stop a permanent stuck white screen:
-
- - JWT payload decode uses base64url (not raw `atob` on `-` / `_`)
- - Do not store a missing / `"undefined"` access token
- - Force clear session and redirect to `/login` when token is unusable
-
- App mitigation does **not** make a WAF-damaged response succeed. WAF/LB still needs tuning so login/refresh return a real JWT.
-
- ## API paths to protect (PNSPS)
-
- Base context path: `/api` (see backend `application.yml`).
-
- | Purpose | Method | Path (after host) |
- |---------|--------|-------------------|
- | Password login | POST | `/api/login` |
- | Refresh token | POST | `/api/refresh-token` |
- | Logout | POST | `/api/logout` |
- | iAM Smart login | POST | `/api/smart/login` |
- | iAM Smart direct login | POST | `/api/smart/directLogin` |
-
- Confirm exact URLs in browser **Network** tab if your reverse-proxy path differs.
-
- ---
-
- ## F5 BIG-IP WAF — step by step
-
- Menu names vary by BIG-IP / ASM / Advanced WAF version. Use the closest equivalent.
-
- ### 1. Confirm which policy sits in front of PNSPS
-
- 1. Log in to the BIG-IP UI.
- 2. Go to **Local Traffic → Virtual Servers**.
- 3. Open the virtual server for `pnsps.gld.gov.hk` (or the VS that terminates TLS for the site).
- 4. Note the attached **Application Security Policy** (ASM) / security policy name.
- 5. Also check whether **Bot Defense**, **DoS**, or other profiles are attached — those can inject HTML challenges.
-
- ### 2. Find what was blocked when `accessToken` became `"undefined"`
-
- 1. Go to **Security → Event Logs → Application → Requests**
- (or **Security → Application Security → Event Logs**).
- 2. Filter around the time of a failed login or blank dashboard.
- 3. Look for:
- - `/api/login`
- - `/api/refresh-token`
- - `/api/smart/login` / `/api/smart/directLogin` if using iAM Smart
- 4. Open the event and record:
- - **Support ID**
- - **Violation** name (signature, illegal meta character, evasion, bot challenge, etc.)
- - Whether the **response** was a block / challenge page instead of JSON
-
- That violation name is what you exception.
-
- ### 3. Ensure API URLs exist in the policy
-
- 1. Open the security policy → **URLs** (or **Policy → URLs**).
- 2. Ensure these URLs exist (exact path as in Network tab), for example:
- - `/api/login`
- - `/api/refresh-token`
- - `/api/smart/login`
- - `/api/smart/directLogin`
- 3. Method: **POST**. Prefer a **JSON** content profile if the policy uses content profiles.
-
- ### 4. Disable response rewriting for these APIs
-
- In the policy, review anything that inspects or rewrites **responses**:
-
- 1. **Data Guard** / **Response scrubbing** / **Information leakage**
- - Disable for `/api/*`, or exclude the URLs above.
- 2. **Response signatures** / checks that modify the body
- - Prefer alarm-only on responses for API URLs, or exclude them.
- 3. **Custom / attack signatures** that false-positive on JWT-looking JSON values
- - JWTs contain `-`, `_`, `.` and long base64url strings.
- - From the event log (step 2), **Learn / Allow / Exception** that signature for that URL only.
-
- ### 5. Add a targeted exception (preferred once violation is known)
-
- From the blocked request in the event log:
-
- 1. Open the request → **Accept / Learn** or **Create exception**.
- 2. Scope narrowly:
- - **URL** = `/api/login` and/or `/api/refresh-token` (and smart login URLs if needed)
- - Prefer **this signature + this URL**, not disabling the whole policy
- 3. Apply / publish the policy.
-
- ### 6. Bot Defense / challenge pages
-
- If the log shows a bot challenge or CAPTCHA HTML page on login/refresh:
-
- 1. Open **Security → Bot Defense** (or the policy Bot profile).
- 2. Whitelist / exception:
- - `/api/login`
- - `/api/refresh-token`
- - smart login paths if needed
- 3. Those endpoints must return **`application/json`** from the app, not an HTML interstitial.
-
- ### 7. Transparent vs Blocking (UAT validation only)
-
- 1. On a **UAT** policy clone, briefly use **Transparent** (or transparent blocking).
- 2. Reproduce login / stay on dashboard through refresh.
- 3. If the problem disappears only in transparent mode, the blocking policy is still rewriting or blocking — use event logs to exception those violations, then return to **Blocking**.
- 4. Do **not** leave production in transparent as the long-term fix.
-
- ### 8. Verify end-to-end
-
- 1. Browser → log in → **Network** → **login** response:
- - `Content-Type: application/json`
- - Body contains long `accessToken` and `refreshToken` strings (three JWT segments each)
- 2. Wait for refresh near expiry (or trigger refresh) → same checks on **refresh-token**.
- 3. Console:
-
- ```javascript
- localStorage.getItem('accessToken')
- ```
-
- Must **never** be the literal `"undefined"`.
-
- ---
-
- ## Message for the F5 admin (copy/paste)
-
- > PNSPS SPA needs `/api/login` and `/api/refresh-token` (POST, JSON), and if used `/api/smart/login` and `/api/smart/directLogin`, to return the backend body unchanged in WAF **blocking** mode. The WAF must not replace them with an HTML block/challenge page or strip/alter `accessToken`. Please identify the violating signature/URL from ASM Event Logs and add a narrow exception; also disable response Data Guard / bot challenge on those API paths if they rewrite JSON.
-
- ---
-
- ## App verification checklist (after frontend deploy)
-
- | Test | Expected |
- |------|----------|
- | Normal password login + logout | Dashboard OK; clean logout |
- | Console: plant `accessToken` = `eyJhbGciOiJIUzUxMiJ9.Pj4-.sig` without `userData`, reload, wait 15s | No repeating `InvalidCharacterError`; redirect to `/login` |
- | Console: plant `accessToken` = `"undefined"` with `userData`, reload | Within ~10s redirect to `/login`; session keys cleared |
- | Login/refresh body missing `accessToken` (WAF case) | Stay on login / fail page or force logout — **not** permanent white screen |
- | iAM Smart success | Still works with real JWT |
-
- ### Console helpers
-
- Plant base64url payload that old `atob` rejected:
-
- ```javascript
- localStorage.removeItem('userData');
- localStorage.setItem('accessToken', 'eyJhbGciOiJIUzUxMiJ9.Pj4-.sig');
- location.reload();
- ```
-
- Plant stuck `"undefined"` session:
-
- ```javascript
- localStorage.setItem('userData', JSON.stringify({id:1,type:'IND',role:'primary'}));
- localStorage.setItem('accessToken', 'undefined');
- location.reload();
- ```
-
- Cleanup:
-
- ```javascript
- localStorage.removeItem('accessToken');
- localStorage.removeItem('userData');
- location.reload();
- ```
-
- ---
-
- ## Responsibility split
-
- | Layer | Role |
- |-------|------|
- | Frontend | Do not store bad tokens; force logout instead of stuck white screen |
- | F5 WAF / LB | Do not damage login/refresh JSON so `accessToken` is present and valid |
-
- ## Related frontend files
-
- - `src/components/RefreshTokenProvider.js` — base64url decode + force logout on bad token
- - `src/auth/index.js` — `isAccessTokenUsable`, `forceLocalLogoutRedirect`, login/refresh guards
- - `src/auth/jwt/jwtService.js` — same guard on JwtService 401 refresh
- - Login forms / iAM Smart callbacks — skip success navigate when token unusable
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